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Consumers do not have perfect information about products. Therefore, product discovery
plays a key role. I use the market for video-games to estimate the causal effect of the release
of a new game on the performance of an older game by the same company. I find that, in the
weeks before the release, the old game underperforms, which is consistent with a substitution
effect between the old and the new game. In the weeks after the release, the old game
increases performance significantly, which suggests that there is a backwards information
spillover. This average treatment effect can be as high as 20% in the number of owners.
Overall, I find that the release of a new game serves as a advert for the old game.
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Resumo
Os consumidores não têm informação perfeita sobre produtos, o que implica que a des-
coberta de produtos é essencial. Usando o mercado de video-jogos, eu estimo o efeito causal
do lançamento de um novo jogo no sucesso de um jogo pré-existente, produzido pela mesma
empresa. Nas semanas antes do lançamento, o jogo pré-existente sofre em termos de número
de utilizadores, o que é consistente com um efeito de substituição entre os dois jogos. Nas
semanas após o lançamento, o jogo pré-existente melhora substancialmente em termos de
número de utilizadores, o que sugere que existe um efeito de transmissão de informação.
O efeito médio de tratamento pode chegar a 20%. Em suma, eu encontro evidência que o
lançamento de um novo jogo serve como publicidade para os jogos pré-existentes.
Palavras-chave: Publicidade, Informação sobre Produto, Informação Imperfeita, Plata-
formas
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Consumers do not have perfect information about products. Therefore, product discovery
plays a key role, particularly in very dynamic markets which generate massive amounts of
information. This creates a role for an information intermediary, such as a platform, that
produces top charts or bestseller lists, that depend on popularity. This intermediary has a
significant impact on the success of a product. In this situation, dominant firms who are
able to sustain high levels of advertising, can augment their market power through presence
in these lists. It also creates a role for advertising which, even if it is persuasive (it affects
the preferences of consumers directly), may be welfare-enhancing as it helps resolve the
information asymmetry.
Moreover, many of these dominant firms are in fact platforms (as they are able to exert a
markup through an information monopoly), such as Steam. These platforms usually use
recommendation systems, in which an algorithm uses the past purchases of the user and the
purchases of users with similar characteristics to provide recommendations. These systems
may reinforce the popularity of already popular games and lead to higher concentration in
sales.
On October 2017, Ubisoft released Assassin’s Creed Origins, a long expected sequel to the
Assassin’s Creed Franchise. However, another game by the same developer, Tom Clancy’s
Rainbow Six Siege, which had been released in December 2015, and which had no relation
whatsoever to the Assassin’s Creed franchise, experienced a significant increase in ownership,
as show in Figure 1. The figure shows the evolution of the natural logarithm of the number
of owners over weeks. I rescale the horizontal axis in order to have a measure of distance
to the new release. This is helpful as it allows me to analyze the percentage change in the
number of owners as the slope of the function.
This effect suggests that there is a significant backwards information spillover in this partic-
ular market, which is a relevant phenomenon as it relates to not only a possible failure in
advertisement but also to the behavior of platforms.
In this thesis, I use a dataset of video-games to estimate the causal effect of the release of
a new game on the performance of older games by the same company. Video-games are an
ideal market to study, as consumers often use platforms that aggregate information about
the products. I find that, in the weeks before the release of a new game, the old game
underperforms. I attribute this to a substitution effect - consumers are either postponing the
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FIGURE 1. Reaction in number of owners
purchase of the older game or they are saving to purchase the new one. In the weeks that
follow the release, there is a slow increase in performance for the old game, peaking at an
average treatment effect of 20%, which then slowly decays. I take this as evidence of product
discovery on the part of the consumers.
I look at this effect by estimating the causal effect of the release of a second game on the
performance on the first game, the effect of a third game on the second game and the effect
of the third game on the first one. In all of these exercises, the results suggest a strong
backwards information spillover associated with the release of a new product that enhances
the performance of the older product. I also compare all adjacent games, in an exercise which
serves to confirm this hypothesis.
There are concerns that part of these results can be driven by a reaction in the pricing
behavior of platforms, either through discounts on the older games or bundling. I cannot
address these concerns directly due to data limitations but, even if they are true, they still
suggest that the platforms internalize product discovery. Therefore, the effects I find are not
causal, but still suggestive.
I also find that the HHI in this market decreases over time. This result is not standard in the
literature and it suggests that aggregate level diversity, which is the number of games avail-
able in the market, is increasing. The literature usually finds that platforms (and product
discovery) increase individual level diversity, which is the number of games in the consider-
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ation set of the consumer, but make no such predictions for aggregate level diversity. The
cause of the increase in aggregate level diversity is not obvious and there are two possible
causes. It could be that there are many entrants producing new games or it could be driven
by product discovery on the part of the consumers. In this work, I find evidence supporting
the latter but cannot analyze the former.
This work is related to Hendricks and Sorensen (2009), who conduct a similar exercise for
the music market. However, I believe that my work adds to the literature by focusing on a
market where the product is consumed over a longer period of time and is more expensive,
which helps rule out impulse purchases that could be driving the result for the music market.
Moreover, the video-game market is dominated by few platforms, which actively price and
advertise products to consumers. This dominance by platforms allows me to show that these
information asymmetries are not fully resolved by the platform and suggests that platforms
may have an information monopoly through which they may extract consumer surplus, thus
increasing their markups.
Overall, I find that the release of a new game serves as an advert for the old game. This
advert is costly, both through the direct cost of a new game and through the negative effect
in the old game in the period before the release, but effective. It remains to be seen whether
this type of advertisement is persuasive or truth-telling.
Related Literature This thesis is related to the field of consumer choice under imperfect
information and to platforms.
Consumers can only decide upon products they know, i.e., products in their consideration
set. Products outside of their consideration set cannot be considered for the decision-making
process. In this sense, imperfect information decreases consumer surplus by restricting the
consideration set. This is common in markets with high product entry. Goeree (2008)
finds that imperfect information is not uniform, as consumers are more informed about
certain brands. Companies with higher advertising expenditure have higher awareness and
are therefore able to capture more surplus.
Similarly, bestseller lists or top charts also restrict the information available to consumers.
Since they promote a specific and relatively small number of products, many consumers focus
only on those. Therefore, as Sorensen (2007) finds, they have an important impact on the
volume of sales. Consumers perceive presence in a bestseller list as a signal for quality, either
directly or indirectly through popularity.
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This effect is also present in online platforms. Aguiar and Waldfogel (2018) report that online
music platforms have a big impact on the success of artists. The platform has the power to
either recommend a song to the user or include the song in certain top charts. Any of these
options would improve the awareness of the product, thus giving platforms a lot of power over
product discovery. In a way, platforms have some degree of control over the management of
imperfect information, since they hold power over which information goes to consumers and
which doesn’t.
As consumers do not have perfect information, product discovery is a relevant element of
the consumer’s problem. Product discovery may take place at the moment of the product
release or sometime during the lifetime of the product. It can be caused by the complexity
of the product or, most likely, by search costs. In this dimension, Bakos (1997) reports that
electronic marketplaces, or online platforms, facilitate product discovery since they lower
search costs.
Online platforms also serve as information intermediaries, as they provide information to
consumers through their recommendation systems. This mechanism causes and, in some
cases, enhances product discovery. It has been suggested, as in Fleder and Hosanagar (2009),
that recommendation systems increase individual product diversity, i.e., the range of products
that the consumer is aware of (consideration set), by lowering search costs through the use
of tailored recommendations to consumers.
As with many intermediaries, platforms exist because they are able to lower search costs and
thus promote product discovery. This in turn helps firms with lower levels of advertising
achieve higher sales, thus increasing the sales tail distribution, as shown in Brynjolfsson, Hu
and Simester (2011). So, on one hand, there is a clear effect in markets with high competition
and imperfect information. On the other hand, there is an opposite effect, where online
platforms reduce imperfect information and facilitate product discovery, specially of lesser
known firms, giving them a possibility to overcome the advertising expenditure differences.
Since these recommendations depend on the overall popularity of the products, Fleder and
Hosanagar (2009) also found that, in media goods, such as video-games, popularity is strongly
self-reinforcing. This may aggravate the problem of imperfect information, as already popular
products (and that consumers are already aware of) become more popular, and less popular
games are less likely to be considered. However, Fleder and Hosanagar (2009) find no evidence
that aggregate level diversity increases due to this phenomenon. They rationalize this finding
by claiming that, as individual consumers receive more information, that information is not
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purely idiosyncratic, as many consumers receive that same signal. Hence, aggregate level
diversity need not increase, as product discovery may imply only a shift in concentration.
In fact, if the self-reinforcing popularity mechanism is very strong, it may be that aggregate
level diversity decreases.
Given both imperfect information and product discovery, the natural focus should be on
decision making – recognition of the product and information search. Recognition of the
product happens through advertising, as the consumer is able to recognize the product from
advertising or other similar products. Information search is also relevant as the consumer
must gather information about the product.
A new product release is a form of advertising as it creates awareness for the product being
released but also for the company releasing it. In a market with heterogeneous products,
advertising enables consumers to obtain accurate information about the product (Grossman
and Shapiro, 1984), and infer information about the brand.
In this spirit, Hendricks and Sorensen (2009) find evidence of backward spillover effects on
the music market, as a release of a second album had a positive impact on the sales of the
first album of the same artist. This is consistent with the two forces outlined above, and with
imperfect information. They claim that the consumers would have bought the first album
if they knew about it, and that the second album serves as an advertising tool for the first
album.
This thesis is organized as follows: section 2 describes the dataset, section 3 presents my em-
pirical strategy and the results, as well as a discussion on possible challenges to identification,
and section 4 concludes.
2 Data
2.1 Data Description
I use a dataset containing information on games from Steam, which is a platform that works
as a video-game digital distribution service. Steam also has a social networking component,
a feature where games are automatically updated and hosts servers for online gameplay. The
data was gathered by Steam Spy, which is a company that specializes in gathering data from
the Steam platform. Steam Spy crawls through a sample of users and estimates the true
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values of the measurements it offers, with its creator stating that its accuracy is around 90%.
The data contains daily observations on 1,685 games, from April 2015 to August 2018. For
each game, I observe the game’s developer, which is the company responsible for creating the
game, and its publisher, which is the company responsible for selling the game. For every
daily observation, I also observe the number of owners of the game. This will be my main
variable of interest.
In this dataset, an owner is defined as a consumer that has purchased the game and currently
has it in his Steam library. If the user has the game in his library, then the game has not
been uninstalled or deleted from the library. It also implies that the user has not deleted his
Steam account. Either of these actions would result on the user forfeiting his ownership of
the game. There is another situation in which the user may forfeit his ownership of the game,
which is if the user is banned. If the user is banned, either temporarily or permanently from
Steam, which may happen through cheating, selling accounts or inappropriate behavior in
the user forums, the user forfeits ownership of all games in his library. It is also possible for
a user to return a game, even though Steam’s return policy is very strict. A game may be
returned with no additional costs in the two-week period after purchase conditional on the
game time being inferior to two hours.
I impose a series of filters in the data. First, I remove all test apps and games for which there
isn’t a single observation. Second, for games that did not have developer or publisher infor-
mation, I manually checked Steam, Steam Spy and Steam DB1 to obtain that information.
I also used this information to correct some release dates.
The raw data is at a daily frequency. However, there are some missing observations for daily
owners. These missing observations were small in number, around 1.67% of the total number
of observations, but they affected roughly half the games in the sample. Since the data
seemed to be missing at random and with no discernible pattern, I decided to aggregate the
data to a weekly frequency, by taking the average of the daily observations. My main variable
of interest is the logarithm of the number of owners, which is a cumulative variable. I chose
the logarithm instead of the level in order to reduce skewness and the number of outliers,
and to obtain a variable that, in principle, could take both negative and positive values. I
present a histogram of this variable in Figure 2, where the vertical dashed line represents the
average.
1Steam DB (Database) is a website containing information about games present on Steam, as well as
several statistics of overall performance and popularity.
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FIGURE 2. Distribution of owners
There seems to be quite a lot of mass around the mean, but the distribution still seems to
be positively skewed, as there is more mass to the right of the mean, but a flatter left tail.
This finding suggests that there are some games that have low ownership numbers but that
there are also a lot of games that are somewhat successful in this lower tier.
I choose a cumulative variable, instead of a flow variable like the number of new owners for
two reasons. First, the flow variable is very noisy. For example, there are sometimes negative
values, which means that the number of owners decreases, which is very unlikely as the return
policy on video-games is quite strict. Second, in my empirical analysis, I will be focusing on
events that unfold over several weeks, which means that I will be comparing the data to a
longer term counterfactual, thus making a stock variable more appropriate.
2.2 Developers
So far, I have been using the entire sample. However, since I am interested in identifying
causal effects on the company, I will need to change my unit of analysis to company. There
are two possibilities - developer, the company that produces the game, and publisher, the
company that distributes it. I will be focusing on developers as publishers are much larger
companies and therefore more susceptible to negative shocks for which I will not be able to
control. 2 On the other hand, developers are smaller companies, for which these effects will
2For example the publisher Electronic Arts lost USD 3.1 billion in value over the negative impact of a
single game (Star Wars Battlefront 2).
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be easier to identify.
Each developer has several games, and I am interested in studying the impact of a release of
a new game on the previous ones. In Figure 3, I plot the evolution of the logarithm of owners
over time since the release date according to the order in which they are released. For each
release order I take the median number of owners of all the games at every week, then the
data is aggregated by month for readability.
FIGURE 3. Owners per release
There are two aspects of interest here. First, it is clear that for most of the time the 1st
release has the highest owners. This happens because it also includes some games launched
before the start of the dataset, which allow it to start at an advantage, both having higher
owners and having time for games to become even more popular. Secondly, the pattern for all
release orders are similar. They start increasing almost exponentially in the first 10 months,
eventually decreasing the growth rate to a lower level. Although release order 4 does stabilize
all the others keep increasing.
The sample is not balanced and there are some developers with pre-existing games. In order
not to lose observations and power, I aggregated these games into a single virtual game,
which is the simple average of all pre-existing games per developer. I will be including these
virtual games in all the analyzes that follow. Excluding them would not significantly change
the results.
There are also some seasonal elements in game releases. In Figure 4, I plot the distribution
of new releases over the different months. This will allow me to check for seasonal effects and
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to identify the ideal months in which developers release games.
FIGURE 4. Releases per month
There are spikes in new releases in April and in the months around Christmas. These are
driven by seasonal fluctuations in demand: releases in April and around Christmas will
overlap with the end of the school year. Moreover, releases around Christmas will be used
as Christmas gifts, which stimulates demand.
Note that Steam is known for regularly having big sales. These discounts have no definitive
calendar, however they seem to have a pattern. The first sale of the year, called the Lunar
Sale, is between the end of January and during February. The second major sale, the Spring
Cleaning Event, usually occurs in the end of April and through May. Next is the Summer
Sale, occurring between June and July. Then comes the Autumn Sale, coming at the end of
November. Lastly is the Winter Sale in December. Note that most releases occur in months
when there are no sales. This indicates that Steam or the developer choose to release the
new games when there are no current sales, which helps in extracting as much surplus as
possible.
In my analysis, I will focus on the effect of the release of the second game on the first game
and on the effect of the release of the third game on the second game. I do this simply
because of data availability. In Figure 5, I plot the distribution of the distance, measured in
weeks, between game releases.
On average, the distance between the two adjacent releases is very similar in the two cases.
The main difference comes from the right tail, i.e., games whose releases are very far apart.
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FIGURE 5. Distribution of distance between releases
This is driven by developers that have only two games that are very far apart, and that will
therefore not appear in the second case. Nevertheless, by looking at distance under 50 weeks,
I will be capture most of the variation in game releases.
First thing to notice is that there is a longer tail in Game 1 to 2. This happens due to the
presence of outliers, who have high distances between the releases of the first and second
game. This might skew the results, and most likely these outliers belong to small developers
who have lower production capabilities or to specific games who took a long time to produce.
On the other hand, the average distance between releases is identical for both cases. This
might be an indicator that there may be some usual time frame for releases, perhaps connected
to the amount of time it takes to produce a new game.
Note that the interquartile range is similar, given the aforementioned reasons this makes
sense. However, the percentile 75 is larger for Game 1 to 2 which indicates a higher spread in
distribution. This might happen because some unsuccessful firms, taking too long too release
new games and finding themselves in straining financial positions might exit the market. This
would explain the fact that releases seem shorter in Game 2 to 3, since one aspect relative
to success might be consistently producing new games in shorter time spans.
Finally notice how the density is higher in the left tail, meaning that most games are released
before the average distance. This is substantiated by the fact that there are outliers increasing
the value of the average time between releases. Furthermore, there are more “smaller” games
being released than “high-visibility” titles. The latter take more time to produce and thus
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TABLE I. Summary Statistics
Panel A: Sales in first year
N Min Percentile 25 Median Mean Percentile 75 Max
Game 1 136 9 143 159 393 287 357 648 745 546 839 7 977 680
Game 2 125 24 286 120 571 203 286 397 638 347 143 6 580 714
Game 3 32 23 857 113 857 181 429 268 821 273 929 1 740 143
Panel B: Sales in first month as fraction of sales in first year
N Min Percentile 25 Median Mean Percentile 75 Max
Game 1 136 10.94% 6.63% 34.25% 58.18% 57.45% 92.41%
Game 2 125 4.12% 4.80% 13.46% 31.20% 25.42% 38.19%
Game 3 32 4.19% 2.67% 13.70% 31.25% 32.50% 38.77%
Panel C: Week with highest increase in owners
N Min Percentile 25 Median Mean Percentile 75 Max
Game 1 136 2 34 114 101 166 177
Game 2 135 2 10 43 56 97 170
Game 3 38 2 10 43 52 86 144
Panel D: Week with highest percentage increase in owners
N Min Percentile 25 Median Mean Percentile 75 Max
Game 1 136 2 2 11 51 111 177
Game 2 135 2 2 3 13 12 121
Game 3 38 2 2 4 11 13 68
are fewer in number, whereas the former can be released more often. Given this, it is clear
that by looking at the distance under 50 weeks, I am able to capture most of the variation.
In my analysis, I will consider the effects within developers and within publisher. In order
to do so, I created two samples. The first one, the developer sample, contains 136 unique
developers and 338 games, with 40,520 weekly observations and an average of 2.5 games per
developer. The second one, the publisher sample, contains 149 unique publishers and 457
games, with 53,507 weekly observations, with an average of 3 games per publisher.
In Table I, I present summary statistics for the developer sample, which will be the main
sample of interest.
Regarding Panel A note that sales are in volume rather than value, so it does not mea-
sure revenue. Instead it measures popularity. Also, note the difference in the number of
observations for each game order, Game 3 has a significantly lower amount of observations.
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The difference in average sales in the first year between the games is inversely proportional
to their release order, where earlier releases have higher sales volume within the first year.
However, when looking at the median values the difference between games is significantly
lower. This happens due to outliers, namely some highly successful games that are increasing
the average value. For this reason, it is necessary to use the logarithm of owners rather than
the level, as well as underlining the necessity to use the stock variable instead of the flow.
The flow variable could take negative values, which would make it impossible to take the
logarithm, decreasing the skewness of the variable. Moreover, the magnitude of the outliers
would simply skew the results. Moreover, due to skewness and kurtosis note how the mean
values are higher or almost equal to the percentile 75.
Game 2 and 3’s statistics for the minimum and percentile 25 values are quite close. This
mostly happens because they share the same early lifecycle progress. Nevertheless, this is
not constant throughout the dataset, since Game 2 is released earlier it has more time to
advance in its lifecycle, thus the differences in percentile 75 and maximum values. Game 3
often does not have enough time observations to reach a more mature phase. The values for
Game 1 are significantly higher for the mean, percentile 75 and maximum values since the
games have more time to develop and grow. Besides, some games belonging to release order
1 were also released prior to the start of the dataset, which means that they can already be
in a more mature phase. Both these factors lead to the aforementioned skewness, which is
more present in release order 1. In terms of the percentage of total first year sales achieved
in the first month, it is clear that where Game 2 and Game 3 values are similar, Game 1
again has major differences.
Note that, on average, almost one-third of first year sales are achieved in the first month
alone. Moreover, the maximum values are not that different, which indicates a small right-
tail. However, when comparing the average values with the median, it is clear that the latter
is driven upwards by some highly successful or highly anticipated releases. Regarding changes
in the stock values, both the absolute and relative variation are presented. It is expected
that games have higher relative changes early in their lifecycle, whereas in terms of absolute
values this is not the case. Discounts, free trials, updates or other external shocks may drive
the absolute variation, however their magnitude is difficult to predict. Once again, for Panel
C, the values for Game 2 and 3 are fairly similar, with Game 1 breaking pattern. However,
it is interesting to see that the distribution seems to be more balanced, with similar tails and
lower differences between the mean and median values. Note that the number of observations
is higher for Game 3 than in the first two panels, since not all games of this release order
have a full year of data points.
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As anticipated, the largest relative changes occur more often early in a game’s lifecycle,
which seems to follow an exponential-like growth in relative terms. Usually games grow
substantially in the first weeks, then eventually the growth rates start to decrease. Game
1, containing previously launched games, has more distant weeks with highest percentage
increase. This happens due to having larger magnitudes in the stock variable, thus needing
strong shocks to cause big increases.
Video-games, contrary to other cultural items, have the possibility to be updated frequently,
thus their lifetime is typically higher than that of other cultural products. Furthermore,
video-games for PC have the possibility to be modified by consumers, this is called modding.
Modding consists of players making significant alterations to the code of the game, altering
several aspects of it. A mod can go as far as changing an entire game, making it almost
unrecognizable. The advantage of modding is that it can further expand the lifetime of a
video-game, some games have lasted several years as bestsellers due to modding , since they
attract a lot of attention and can easily be transformed into an almost new product by adding
a mod. This impacts the sales path of individual games, since declining sales may suddenly
have its trend inverted by having a mod released for that game, thus making it difficult to
infer highly accurate information from summary statistics.
For context, either in the developer or the publisher sample, no company has a market share
of even 7%. This indicates that the market is not concentrated, but instead highly diversified.
The main reason for this scenario is that there are several companies that produce games
with high visibility, thus making it difficult for any company to keep a persistent market
leadership position. Moreover, given the heterogeneity of both products and consumers, it
is difficult for video-game companies to have products that keep players engaged mostly
with their own offerings. Although at purchase games might be competitors, much like in
the overall cultural industry it is common for a consumer to eventually purchase multiple
products and use them actively, as such it is challenging for a company to stay ahead of
the competition. The publisher sample has an average Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of
0.0227 through time. This is quite low, meaning that in a market with similar competition
there would be 44 different publishers. For the developers the market seems to be a bit more
concentrated with an HHI of 0.026 which would mean 39 equal-sized firms in a perfectly
balanced market. Next, I present a plot depicting the evolution of HHI through time, and
this is relevant to understand how concentration or market powers changes through time.
Furthermore, in some sense it might bring some insights into the idea that platforms increase
individual level diversity, while at the same time decrease aggregate level diversity (Fleder
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and Hosanagar, 2009). Should the HHI decrease through time, I expect this to come from
one of two effects. In a market with single-product firm or multi-product firm with a stable
number of products, a steady decrease in HHI means that new entrants are gaining market
power consistently. On the other hand, in a similar scenario this might not be caused by new
entrants but rather by product discovery. This would mean that contrary to the literature
aggregate level diversity is actually increasing.
However, should the HHI increase through time and should I find clear evidence of product
discovery, this confirms the idea of Fleder and Hosanagar (2009), where individual consumers
have their diversity increased, while at the same time, because many consumers are discov-
ering the same product, aggregate level diversity may in fact be decreasing. Therefore, in
Figure 6, I plot the evolution of the HHI over time for developers.
FIGURE 6. HHI for developers
Figure 6 shows that concentration decreases through time. This indicates that in fact, due
to market entrance or product discovery, aggregate level diversity is increasing, thus driving
concentration levels down. Although the dataset has a short time span, this may be in-
dicative of a larger effect, where platforms stimulate these effects. Lower concentration and
market power indicate that markups may be transferred from the video-game companies to
the platform itself. Since the video-game companies face now lower levels of concentration
this stimulates either price competition or higher investment in advertising, decreasing their
markups. Meanwhile, the platform seems to gain higher relative power over the suppliers,
giving it higher markups.
The spike present in week 3 is caused by two developers, Gearbox Software and Tango
Gameworks more than doubling their market share from one week to the next. This could be
either due to measurement error or perhaps a sale for the games from these developers which
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inflated their respective game’s ownership. It is possible to see the exact same pattern, of
continuously decreasing HHI through time, as well as similar spikes within the first 50 weeks,
in the publisher sample. These results respect the trend in the literature, where it has been
found that the internet, in reducing search costs and helping decrease imperfect information,




The goal of this thesis is to measure the impact of a new game release on the number of
owners of pre-existing games by the same developer. I will be focusing on developers, but I
present results for publishers in the Appendix.
The Average Treatment Effect (ATE) is the measure of how much the outcome changes due
to the treatment. In this case, it is how much the number of owners of a game changes due
to being treated for some period. This statistic will be computed by comparing a treatment
group, the games from developers whose new release is in period 𝑡, and the control group,
which consists of games that have not yet been treated. Therefore, all games in my sample
will be treated, which makes this a staggered implementation. The treatment window is
50 weeks long, as I include 10 weeks before the release of the new game to estimate the
pre-release effect and 40 weeks after.
There are two reasons for including the pre-release period in the treatment window. First,
companies will often pursue promotional activity relative to the release, and this will already
expose consumers to the new release and may impact the previous games. Second, games can
either be sequential in story or simply connected, which could mean that players might want
to play through the games in the correct sequence, meaning that they would purchase the
previous game, play it, then purchase the new release. All this could be done in the weeks
following up to the new release.
All games in the sample will be treated only once, as they are removed from the sample after
the end of the treatment window. I am therefore using games that have not yet been treated
as counterfactuals to games that have been treated. Hence, the data I will be using for the
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regression includes all the treatment windows for all games.
Let 𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡 be the outcome variable, the logarithm of the number of owners, for game 𝑖 in week
𝑡, which is 𝑠 ∈ [−10, 40] weeks away from the release of the new game. The ATE will be the
difference between 𝑦𝑠𝑖𝑡 and 𝑦⋆𝑖𝑡, which is the counterfactual outcome. I will be conducting a
multi-period difference in differences analysis, which is estimated as










𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡, 𝑠 ∈ [−10, 40] (1)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the number of owners, for game 𝑖 in week
𝑡, which is 𝑠 ∈ [−10, 40] weeks away from the release of the new game. I include a developer
fixed effect 𝛼𝑐 to account for persistent differences across developers and a time fixed effect
𝜆𝑡 to account for common shocks. This time fixed effect will also partially account for the
natural life-cycle of the games. I then include a series of month-of-the-year fixed effects 𝑑𝑚𝑡
to account for seasonality. The coefficients of interest are the 𝛽𝑠, which multiply an indicator
variable that takes the value of 1 if the game is 𝑠 weeks away from a new release, and which
represent the ATE. Errors are clustered at the developer level.
I will further restrict the sample by looking first at the impact of the second release on the
first game, the impact of the third release on the second game and the impact of the third
release on the first game, in order to disentangle possible persistent effects.
3.2 Results
In this subsection, I will report the results of Equation 1 for the sample in which developers
are the unit of analysis.3 I will begin by analyzing the case of the release of the second game,
and its impact on the first game.4 I present the estimated 𝛽𝑠 from Equation 1 in Figure 7,
which then contains both the ATE and a 95% confidence interval.
There are three different elements in the plot: (1) effect before launch is either null or
negative, (2) positive effects only starts of after 10 weeks and (3) effect is very persistent.
Regarding the first element, having negative effects may stem from two factors. First, there
3The results in the publisher sample were fairly similar, with all regressions showing the same path for
the effect through time.
4This regression includes the virtual games, but results remain largely unchanged if these games are
excluded
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FIGURE 7. ATE for release of second game on first game
may be a plain substitution effect, where consumers would rather wait and purchase the
newer game. Secondly, the above-mentioned substitution effect may not be permanent, and
consumers may rather wait, purchase the new release and only then purchase the previous
game.
The second element is that owners starts increasing as the treatment period increases. This
effect starts occurring significantly after 10 weeks, giving more than enough time for players
to both finish the new release and discover the previous game from the same developer. The
effect starts small, with only 10% more owners for games whose developer had a new release
11 weeks ago.
Besides the backward spillover effects caused by information spillovers and product discovery,
this positive impact may also partially be explained by having games which are complemen-
tary products. Game franchises, or game sequels that follow similar or shared story lines can
be considered complementary products, not in the sense that they are often bought together,
but in the sense that there is extra utility for the consumer in owning both products. In the
video games case this would be translated in completing fully the story line.
The third element depicted is the persistency of the effects, which are significant until the
end of the treatment window. This shows signs that product discovery occurs at different
times for different consumers.
The positive effects ranges from 2% to 11% increases in the amount of owners due to the
new release. It is clear that the effect has time dynamics, in the sense that as one moves
17
further from the new release the impact decreases, until it eventually dies out. This would
indicate the such a window is the optimal time for product discovery, and that after such a
time, discovering the previous game would be more likely by chance or some other exogenous
shock.
I can also compute the ATE for the release of the third game on the second game, which are
represented in Figure 8.
FIGURE 8. ATE for release of third game on second game
The main difference between this regression and the previous one is the noise. There are less
observations available in this scenario, since not all developers launch 3 games. This is why
the standard errors are significantly larger for this regression. Nevertheless, similar effects are
present. With null effects before the new release and persistent positive effects afterwards.
The null effects arise based on the same explanation as before, a decision made by consumers
to postpone the purchase of the previous game until after the new release. However, given
the null effects here it might simply be the case where information hasn’t had enough time
to spread. Both in arising consumer’s interest to look for other games of the same developer,
or for recommender systems to start delivering this information to consumers, there needs to
be enough time to capture the positive effects of the new release, where good publicity and
overall appraisal of the new release play important parts.
The positive effects start showing just after week 10, a couple weeks later than previously, but
still indicative of a possible pattern. They are persistent throughout the remaining treatment
window, hitting its maximum of 31% in week 20 and then slowly declining.
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In this case the effects are substantially higher than the previous one, ranging between 2%
to 31%. This may arise due to consumers having more time to recognize the developer. In
this situation, consumers would possibly have been exposed to other previous games from
developers, which might create a higher reputation effect.
Moreover, this particular time window captures a specific game more prominently, given
that it uses fewer observations. The estimated ATE are mostly driven by the effect of the
release of Assassin’s Creed Origins on Tom Clancy’s Rainbow Six Siege, which are both very
successful games. Nevertheless, and despite the noise, the results are largely in line with
those I presented above.
I will also present ATE for the release of the third game on the first one, which are represented
in Figure 9.
FIGURE 9. ATE for release of third game on first game
The results here suggest that the effects are persistent, but they might be direct or indirect
(through the second game). However, the ATE is not very well identified in this case, as there
might be overlapping variation between the direct and indirect effects. However, differential
identification is not possible.
The effects are much smaller in this case, only showing positive effects at all 27 weeks after
the release. However, the pattern is very similar, with either null or negative effects prior to
the release, then a gradual increase until they become positive and significant.
The loss of observations may be related to firm’s success. It is expected that more successful
firms are able to consistently keep launching new games. Whereas unsuccessful firms, who
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fail or take too long to launch new games may exit the market. This would indicate that
the observations in higher release orders have a skewness towards more successful firms.
However, given the low amount of observations it is not possible to analyze the difference in
ATE between more and less successful firms.
3.3 Adjacent Games
So far, I have considered samples which do not overlap. However, in principle, the relevant
ATE should be computed for all consecutive releases for the developers. In order to do this,
I use Equation 1 and include all consecutive releases. This implies that the same game may
appear more than once (once as an observation and once as a release date), and that there
might be overlapping time periods. The results are represented in Figure 10.
FIGURE 10. ATE for adjacent games
There are two distinct periods here. The first period, until roughly 10 weeks after the release
and the second one, from that point until the end of the treatment window. The first period
shows null effects, which can be attributed to a postponing of the decision to purchase the
game only after the release or simply that the release does not affect the previous game yet.
The second period, starting at 8 weeks post-release, shows uninterrupted positive effects.
These impacts range from 1% (in the last period of the treatment window) to a peak of 18%
(15 weeks after the release).
In terms of the evolution of the impacts, there’s a clear arc, where the effect starts becoming
positive, then peaks and eventually declines until it becomes almost null again. Nonetheless,
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it produces evidence that games do have a significant and decisive increase in owners when
a new game is released.
The pattern is similar to the one presented before, which serves as a validation of the shape of
the effects. However, note how there are only null effects in Figure 10. This could mean that
although some consumers are in fact either postponing the purchase decision, or substituting
the previous game with the new release, the bigger effect is that information has not started
to spread yet. This seems reserved to only after the release, which in theory makes sense,
since it gives consumers time to first acquire information regarding the new game and then
infer qualities on the developer and their products from it.
As the number of games between releases increases, there are still positive impacts of the
new release. The effects do not appear anymore when there is a 3-game gap between the
games in question, which means that such a gap is the limit of the backward spillover effect
between two games.
The adjacent regression is basically an average of the backward spillover effects through
several release orders. One main difference is that if there were local time shocks, on this
regression they will be diluted. This means that the accuracy in capturing the ATE in theory
is higher here than before.
Moreover, overlapping time periods, and focusing on distance between release orders, allows
for a higher number of observations, which further increases the accuracy of results. On
the other hand, for higher release orders, which contain smaller observations, there is the
possibility that only more successful firms survived in the market that far. This might skew
the results, as it is more likely for successful firms to produce successful games, therefore
being more prone to backward spillover effects due to signaling effect and overall positive
perception of the brand.
On the other hand, it is expected that more successful firms achieve higher awareness in their
products, which would imply that there are less consumers that have no knowledge of their
already existing products. These two opposite effects are present the previous regression, and
it seems that the former has a higher magnitude than the latter, however given the higher
amount of observations for earlier release orders, these might be diluted.
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3.4 Challenges to Identification
The main challenge to identification is that the release of the second game is not exogenous
with respect to the first game. For example, if a developer releases a sequel to previous
game, this is most likely the consequence of a long-term plan. In that sense, the ATE are
not estimated consistently. However, my sample contains very few sequels, which suggests
that the problem is not big.5 Moreover, there is also cause to believe that the release of the
second game is conditioned on some measure of performance of the second game, i.e., if the
early game is a success. If this was true, it would be unlikely that I would observe a negative
ATE in the weeks before the release of the second game.
A second challenge is related to bundling or discounts. As these games are sold on a platform,
it is possible that the platform bundles the games together by developer and may offer a
discount on the old game upon the release of the new game. In this case, the ATE is not
consistent as the price, not the information spillover, is driving the result. However, it seems
unlikely that it is driving all of it, otherwise the price would have been lower in the first place,
assuming that the platform chooses prices optimally. Nevertheless, it would be important to
account for bundles and discounts, which I cannot do in this sample.
However, in the case where the consumer had no knowledge about the previous product,
the bundle may serve as well as an informational spillover, since it informs consumers about
the new release as well as the previous one. Should the bundle be purchased, there is still
backward spillover effects, independently of the price charged, given that the consumer will
only purchase the bundle and not the individual new release due to backward spillover effects.
Steam is known for regularly having big sales, which follow a similar pattern every year, with
small deviations in terms of dates. So it may be the case that some of the variation being
captured is cause by local sales shocks rather than backward spillover effect. However, this
is unlikely to happen throughout several release orders and even less likely in the adjacent
games regression. Nevertheless, if it is the case it would invalidate the results, meaning that
I’m only capturing the effect of the sale.
My outcome variable is a stock variable. In an ideal world, I would use the change in the
number of owners to estimate the ATE. However, that data is very noisy and most likely
suffers from measurement error. For example, there are several observations for which the
number of new owners is negative, which means that individuals returned the game. This
5There are only 17 sequels in my dataset. I use the standard definition of sequel, which requires a coherent
and evolving storyline.
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is close to impossible, as Steam has a very strict return policy. Therefore, using a stock
variable reduces the weight of each observation, which effectively dampens our estimation for
the ATE, which can be then thought of as a lower bound. However, it also reduces the impact
of the measurement error and, if that error is uncorrelated over time, may yield increasingly
consistent estimates.
The sample also exhibits some measurement error, which is not just present in the number
of owners. This measurement error does not seem to exhibit any discernible pattern, and I
am therefore assuming it is random. In this case, a random measurement error will again
imply dampening, i.e., my estimates for the ATE are being pushed towards zero.
There is also a concern that, even without using a stock variable, there is significant time
dependence in games over time. The ideal approach to solve this problem would be to
model this dependence explicitly using the method in Newey and West (1987). If there is
time dependence, even though the ATE effects are not affected, the standard errors are not
consistent. However, using this method involves the estimation of an additional vector of
parameters, with limited power. Given the structure of the data, I find that clustering by
developer, which accounts for variation within the developer, is a first order problem, and
more important than addressing time dependence. Hence, in a choice between the two, I
would prefer to cluster. Moreover, if the time dependence in the games is not very different
within the developer, the combination of the developer fixed effect and the clustering already
accounts for it.
4 Conclusion
Consumers do not have perfect information about products. Therefore, product discovery
plays a key role, particularly in very dynamic markets which generate massive amounts of
information. This creates a role for an information intermediary, such as a platform, that
produces top charts or bestseller lists, that depend on popularity. This intermediary has a
significant impact on the success of a product. In this situation, dominant firms who are
able to sustain high levels of advertising, can augment their market power through presence
in these lists. Moreover, product discovery on the part of consumers is also an important
element for the success of a product.
In this thesis, I use a dataset of video-games to estimate the causal effect of the release of
a new game on the performance of older games by the same company. Video-games are an
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ideal market to study, as consumers often use platforms that aggregate information about
the products. I find that, in the weeks before the release of a new game, the old game
underperforms. I attribute this to a substitution effect - consumers are either postponing
the purchase of the older game or they saving to purchase the new one. In the weeks that
follow the release, there is a slow increase in performance for the old game, peaking at an
average treatment effect of 20%, which then slowly decays. I take this as evidence of product
discovery on the part of the consumers.
There are concerns that part of these results can be driven by a reaction in the pricing
behavior of platforms, either through discounts on the older games or bundling. I cannot
address these concerns directly due to data limitations but, even if they are true, they still
suggest that the platforms internalize product discovery. Therefore, the effects I find are not
causal, but still suggestive.
Overall, I find that the release of a new game serves as an advert for the old game. This
advert is costly, both through the direct cost of a new game and through the negative effect
in the old game in the period before the release, but effective. It remains to be seen whether
this type of advertisement is persuasive or truth-telling.
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Appendix
FIGURE A.1. ATE for release of second game on first game
FIGURE A.2. ATE for release of third game on second game
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FIGURE A.3. ATE for release of third game on first game
FIGURE A.4. ATE for adjacent games
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